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Abstract
The financial relationship between banks and microfinance institutions (MFIs) is a key element of the debate on
establishing accessible financial systems in sub-Saharan countries. Today, MFIs face strong and growing pressure in
terms of resources, especially due to an increasing demand for funding, both in number and volumes. However, there
is virtually no academic literature on refinancing between banks and MFIs. Also, the existing empirical literature on
microfinance access to external funding has to some extend neglected the importance of bank financing funds,
focusing more on international external funds. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the access of MFIs to external
funds from the local banking system. Specifically, we examine the link between an MFI's access to Banks funding and
its maturity and performance. From a panel of 156 Senegalese MFIs, we have created a fixed-effects model to help
explain the influence of key variables (MFI size, profitability, risk, etc.) on an MFI's ability to raise funds from the
local banking system. The results show that bank financing generally benefit large MFIs, those with significant tangible
assets and with a high quality portfolio. Profitability does not seem to be a key determinant of MFI's access to bank
funding. However, the funds deposited by microfinance organizations in banks act as a financing guarantee and
strongly help MFIs to raise funds from local commercial banks.
The data of this study come from the consolidated financial statements that MFIs provide to the Senegalese Economy and Finance Ministry
through the AT/CPEC Unit. We want to thank this structure, now called DRS/SFD (Directorate of Regulation and Supervision of the
Decentralized Financial Systems). We also thank the ‘Consortium for Economic and Social Research' (CRES) for the proofreading done on
this document.
Citation: François Seck Fall, (2017) ''Determinants of Microfinance institutions' access to bank credit in Senegal'', Economics Bulletin,
Volume 37, Issue 2, pages 1327-1338
Contact: François Seck Fall - francois-seck.fall@ut-capitole.fr.
Submitted: December 08, 2016.   Published: June 11, 2017.
 
   
1. Introduction 
   
 
At the sectors’ current level of development, access to external funding is an important issue 
for microfinance institutions (MFIs). Today, many MFIs have matured and aspire to external 
financing to meet the increasing needs of their clients. This strategic orientation towards 
external resources is explained, in particular, by the willingness of mature MFIs to emancipate 
themselves from donors and certain regulatory constraints. In Latin America, for example, 
NGOs are turning into banks to increase their resource mobilization potential (see D’Espallier 
et al., 2017; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2007). This phenomenon is discernible through the 
increasing number of publications on access to the capital market of microfinance (Dorfleitner 
et al., 2016; Brière and Szafarz, 2015; Mersland, 2013; Mersland and Urgeghe, 2013; 
Mersland and Strøm, 2010; Ghosh and Tassel, 2013; Reille and Forster 2008; Reille et al., 
2011; Tchuigoua, 2016; Jayadev and Rao, 2012). This research often analyze the link between 
the access to foreign capital and certain MFIs characteristics such as size, financial and social 
performance, regulation, and governance. These studies have focused mainly on Latin 
America and Asia, where microfinance has the largest access to foreign capital. However, this 
trend is less evident in other regions such as West Africa, where MFIs have access to public 
savings and less developed financial markets. In this context, local banking resources are the 
main source of external funding for mature MFIs. Where local resources exist, it is preferable 
for MFIs to mobilize them. Unlike foreign capital subject to foreign exchange risk, internal 
banking resources may be less risky and more beneficial to the domestic economy. 
Unfortunately, the literature has paid little attention to the role of banks in the refinancing of 
MFIs. We attempt to remedy this by analyzing the access of MFIs to external resources from 
local commercial banks. 
In Senegal, the microfinance sector has experienced exceptional growth since its appearance 
in the late 1980s (Fall, 2015). The number of microfinance institutions jumped from 18 in 
1993 to over 800 in 2008 then fell to 238 in 2011, due to the new regulation that came into 
force in 20081. The microfinance sector is organized by the Ministry of Economy and Finance 
in collaboration with BCEAO2. The sector is dominated by a few large networks that hold 
most of the market share in terms of the amount of savings, the credit, and the number of 
members. One of the current major challenges for microfinance in Senegal is working 
together with the traditional banking sector. Their cooperation is handled by State authorities. 
A National Microfinance Support Fund has been set up to promote the refinancing of 
microfinance by local banks. Investment funds are created by NGOs and development 
partners to further encourage banks to refinance the microfinance sector. Considering the 
structure of the financial system and the diversity of the demand, the cooperation between 
banks and MFIs—especially for refinancing—is a decisive factor in the success of financial 
intermediation in Senegal and in the rest of the sub-region. However, there have been no 
studies examining this issue. This lacuna is neither specific to Senegal nor to the UEMOA 
region. Empirical studies on the relationship between banks and MFIs have generally focused 
on the possible ways in which both sectors can move closer together (Fall, 2010, 2009).  
                                                          
1
 Prior to 2008, the sector was composed of three categories of MFIs: the mutual benefit societies or savings and 
credit cooperatives (MEC), the savings and credit groups (GEC) and the structures under convention (SSCC). 
Currently, there is single license regime and GECs have disappeared. One of the objectives of this new 
regulation has been the concentration of the sector, with the disappearance of the savings and credit groups 
(GECs). 
2
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The purpose of this paper is to analyze the access of MFIs to external funds from the local 
banking system. Specifically, we examine the link between an MFI’s access to Banks funding 
and its maturity and performance. The existing empirical literature on microfinance access to 
external funding has to some extend neglected the importance of bank financing funds, 
focusing more on international external funds (Mersland, Randøy, and Strøm, 2011; Mersland 
and Urgeghe, 2013; Hartarska and Nadolnyak, 2008). We extend this strand of literature by 
exploring the importance of the factors that influence the ability of MFIs for their access to 
domestic bank financing. To our knowledge, this article is the first, to empirically investigate 
the financial relationship between banks and Microfinance. To date, no empirical study has 
been conducted on this issue, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. From a panel of 156 
Senegalese MFIs, we have created a fixed-effects model to help explain the influence of key 
variables (MFI size, profitability, risk, etc.) on an MFI’s ability to raise funds from the 
banking system. The results show that bank financing generally benefit large MFIs, those with 
significant tangible assets and with a high quality portfolio. Profitability does not seem to be a 
key determinant of MFI’s access to bank funding. However, the funds deposited by 
microfinance organizations in banks act as a financing guarantee and strongly help secure 
funds from partner banks. The first section of this paper (Section 2) highlights the significant 
role financing plays in the relationship between banks and MFIs in West Africa. Section 3, 
details the methodology of the study, and then turns to a more detailed explanation of the 
fixed-effects econometric model, addressing the issues of heterogeneity and autocorrelation of 
errors. Finally, section 4 analyzes the various results while section 6 summarizes the main 
conclusions. 
 
2. Reasons for the financing relationship between Bank and Microfinance in Sub-
Saharan Africa 
 
There are four major reasons why banks and MFIs need to work together in sub-Saharan 
Africa. First, the businesses of microfinance customers are growing and many of them are 
moving towards the meso scale. It stands to reason that these larger customers translate into 
additional resource constraints for MFIs. MFIs need to meet these funding needs, which are 
increasing in volume and for longer periods. Moreover, due to their limited capacity in terms 
of transformation, it is clear that the external contribution of resources will be decisive in 
maintaining the loyalty of customers who are now mature (Tchuigoua, 2016; Dorfleitner et 
al., 2016). Thus, it is important for the microfinance sector to draw closer to the banking 
sector. The second reason lies in the fact that a large number of SMEs operate on the border 
line between both sectors, and crucially lack access to financing from both sectors. The 
literature uses the notion of "missing middle" to designate this type of SME. These are SMEs, 
which in terms of size and funding are somewhat out of the reach of microfinance but have 
not yet reached a level of institutional and organizational viability that can generate 
confidence among banks. Some of these are microfinance clients who have reached maturity 
and need financing that exceeds the capacity of microfinance. While banks have the long-term 
resources to support SMEs’ projects, MFIs have the most effective funding technology 
through ensuring far less risky commitments (Fall, 2011). Thus, banks and MFIs need to work 
together to ensure that all companies have access to financing, especially SMEs who 
traditionally fall into the gap between both. The third reason that both sectors must work in 
combination is due to the fact that banks within the UEMOA3 area have an excess liquidity 
(see Caprio and Honohan, 1993). During the past few years, banks in this region have gained 
attention because of their liquidity surpluses. There seems to be a consensus that the idle 
resources of the banking sector could be optimized by financing microfinance institutions, 
which are faced with vital financing needs. Therefore, the banking sector would do well to 
join forces with the microfinance sector. The fourth reason relates to the current trend of 
development funding policies. After years of setbacks in these policies, which were based on 
receiving external funds, the mobilization of local resources now seems to be unanimously 
approved by development cooperation stakeholders. Such cooperation is now considered as 
the greatest need and the most powerful driving force behind development (Younossian, Fino 
& Servet, 2007). If funding is now to come from local resources, a particular emphasis should 
be placed on banking and microfinance working together, since neither can effectively meet 
the needs of all segments of the population on their own. Their coordination is crucial for 
effectively mobilizing local resources to promote development. Consequently, it should be 
stressed that for MFIs, resorting to local resources (thus to banks) is often preferable to 
relying on external funds, which are subject to the exchange risk. Thus, there are several good 
reasons that the financing of microfinance institutions by banks is at the heart of the debate. 
Contrary to other regions such as Latin America, where microfinance is mature and has 
integrated with the rest of the financial system, microfinance in the UEMOA region, as in 
most African countries, is still seeking viability and maturity. Most microfinance institutions 
still depend on increasingly dwindling grants due to financial viability reasons. Moreover, 
very few of them have the same power to create money as traditional banks or the ability to 
raise funds in regional or international financial markets. In such a context, funding remains a 
major concern for the majority of MFIs, all the more so as mesofinance activities are 
expanding.   
   
3.  Data and methodology 
  
In this study, 156 unbalanced Senegalese MFIs were analyzed from 2001 to 2008. A database 
was made from the consolidated financial statements that MFIs provide to the Senegalese 
Economy and Finance Ministry through the AT/CPEC4 Unit. Table 1 provides the descriptive 
statistics of certain variables: financing (BkFund), equity capital, medium-term and long-term 
credit (CMLT), deposits, and size. Financing resources obtained by MFIs in the sample 
amounted to 109 million CFA francs on average, with a maximum amount reaching 10.3 
billion. The medium-term and long-term credit granted by MFIs totaled 420 million CFA 
francs on average, with a maximum of 40.7 billion. On average, funds obtained from banks 
constituted around 26% of the medium-term and long-term loans of MFIs sampled, which 
clearly shows the importance of bank financing in handling MFIs’ medium-term and long-
term credit. Consequently, since the banking system provided 26% of MFIs’ external 






                                                          
3
 West African Economic and Monetary Union 
4
 This department of the Economy and Finance Ministry is now called ‘Direction de la Réglementation et de la 
Supervision des Systèmes Financiers Décentralisés’ (DRS/SFD). (In English: Directorate of Regulation and 
Supervision of the Decentralized Financial Systems)  
5
 The Savings collected by MFIs are often short-term savings, which explains why the funding of medium-term 
and long-term loans is mostly covered by external resources. 
  
 
Table 1:  
Descriptive Statistics (in billions CFA francs). This table reports the descriptive statistics on key variables of 
the study. BkFuund = the amount of financing resources obtained by the MFI with the banking sector; Stockholders’ Equity = 
the amount of the MFI’s equity capital; CMLT= the amount of the medium and long-term loans given by the institution; 
Customer Deposits = the volume of the savings collected by the institution; Loans = the amount of loans given by the MFI to 
its members; Total Assets = total balance sheet; MFIs’s Deposits in Bank= the volume of the funds deposited in banks. 









Average 0.109 0.299 0.420 0.604 0.735 1.110 0.039 
Std. Dev. 0.714 1.810 2.820 4.060 4.170 6.480 0.199 
Min 0 -0.961 0 0 0 0 -0.022 
Max 10.3 20.5 40.7 62.2 63.500 97.600 2.980 
Observations 783 783 783 783 783 783 783 
 Sampling Period 2001-2008  
 
 
In this paper, we analyze the link between the access to funds provided by banks and several 
variables measuring the maturity and the performance of an MFI. We hypothesize that the 
some microfinance characteristic such as maturity and performance are related to the access to 
funding from banks. The maturity here is measured by the size of the MFI. The main proxy 
variable is the logarithm of the “total assets”. The performance is approximated by two 
variables: the return on assets (ROA) and the quality of the portfolio (portfolio risk). Based on 
the Fisher and Breusch Pagan and tests, we consider the following fixed-effects model:  













i refers to the specific effect on the individual, and it  the residual; the variable to be 
explained is represented by Bkfund, which gives the amount of financing resources obtained 
by the MFI from the banking sector6. Xit is the vector of the explanatory variables; Size, the 
size of the institution, measured by the logarithm of its total balance sheet; Roa, the economic 
profitability measured by the ratio Net Result/Total Assets. Gar (1, 2) refers to the guarantee 
given by the MFI, or the guarantee signal given by the MFI through the value of its assets. 
The guarantee in this case is covered by two variables: the value of the lands (Gar 1) and 
those of the other fixed assets (Gar 2)7. Risk means the MFI portfolio risk understood through 
the amount of outstanding loans. FP is the amount of the MFI’s equity capital, and Sub, the 
                                                          
6
 Here, we consider medium to long-term loans for financing variable. 
7
 Separating the value of land from other physical assets is justified by trying to understand the property effect in 
relation to the banking sector. Currently, the real-estate market is booming and many microfinance 
organizations, especially large networks, have invested in real-estate in recent years. Therefore, highlighting this 
variable in the model seemed pertinent. 
volume of the grants received by the MFI. The MFI’s activity is evaluated through the loans 
given and the savings collected. Dmbres is the volume of the savings collected by the 
institution. Plcbank is the volume of the funds deposited in banks,8 Pmbres, the amount of 
loans given by the MFI to its members, and CMLT is the amount of the medium-term and 
long-term loans given by the institution. 
    The Fisher and Breusch Pagan tests indicate that the fixed-effects model offers a better 
modeling of the determinants of bank financing by MFIs. The Fisher test validates the 
hypothesis of the presence of fixed effects, while the Breusch Pagan test rejects the hypothesis 
of the presence of random effects9. The fixed-effects model indicates that the specific effects 
are correlated to the explanatory variables, where as the random effects model assumes that 
these fixed effects are orthogonal to the explanatory variable of the model.    
  The fixed-effects model underscores the heterogeneity of the data in their individual 
dimensions. Thus, the presence of heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation in the errors of the 
model is probable. The error term of the basic model is broken down as follows: itiit vu 
 
The term iu indicates the individual unobservable effect and itv indicates a random disruption. 
Several reasons support the conclusion that heteroscedasticity is present. One source of 
heteroscedasticity may be the heterogeneity of the data10. The sample is made up of MFIs that 
have very different legal statuses (119 MEC, 23 GEC, 8 Reseau, 6 SSCC), as well as location, 
size, the dominant nature of their activity, and so forth. A second source of heteroscedasticity 
may be the asymmetry in the distribution of certain explanatory variables, such as size, the 
amount of credit, and the amount of savings. For example, between GECs and the networks, 
there are wide disparities in the distribution of the Bkfund variable, which is the primary 
variable in the model. Charts below show that indeed, there is a dissymmetry in the 
distribution of this variable between GECs, MECs, SSCCs and the networks. The 
microfinance networks explain over 50% of the Bkfund variable. In this context, tests needed 
to be conducted in order to detect the presence in the word error of problems of 
heteroscedasticity and/or autocorrelation. The fact that the sample is disparate may also be a 
source of heteroscedasticity.  
 
                                                          
8
 It is also important to isolate the effect of MFIs’ deposits in banks, which is why this variable is isolated. 
9
 In these conditions, the Hausman test, which is used to discriminate between fixed effects and variables, is of 
no use as the hierarchy between the two models cannot be examined. These two tests allow us to take into 
account the heterogeneity of the data, while the hypotheses on the nature of the specific effects differ from one 
model to the other. 
10
 For a better understanding of the sources of heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, see Valerie Mignon (2008), 





  The Breusch Pagan and White tests confirmed that heteroscedasticity was present. The 
heteroscedasticity of errors led to calculating the fixed-effects model with the White 
correction, with the results given in Table 2 below (model 2). By correcting for 
heteroscedasticity, the only changes concerned the significance levels of the explanatory 
variables. The White correction reduced the significance level of all the explanatory variables 
except for the Roa and Gar 1 variables. The Size variable, which had a significance threshold 
of 5%, now became significant at 10% after correcting for heteroscedasticity. The constant, 
which was significant at the threshold of 10%, was now significant at 5%. The Gar 2 variable, 
which was significant at the threshold of 1%, was no longer significant at the threshold of 
10%. Ten per cent was accepted as the maximum significance threshold; therefore, the Gar 2 
variable was no longer significant. The Risk and Sub variables, which before correction were 
significant at 1%, were now significant at 5%. The FP and PlcBank variables jumped from a 
significance threshold of 1% to 10%. The Gar1, Dmbres, Pmbres and CMLT variables 
remained significant at the threshold of 1%. 
Table 2.  
Estimations of the determinants of MFIs’ ability to raise funds from the banking system. This table summarizes the results of tree models. 
Model (1) is the estimation of Fixed-effects Model; Model (2) is the estimation of Fixed-effects Model with corrected heteroscedasticity; 
Model (3) is the estimation of OLS. The dependent variable is the financing, the amount of financing resources obtained by the MFI in the 
banking sector. (*), (**), (***) represent the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent confidence levels. The variable to be explained is 
represented by Bkfund, which gives the amount of financing resources obtained by the MFI with the banking sector (here medium to long-
term loans). Size = the logarithm of its total balance sheet (the size of the MFI).  Roa= the economic profitability measured by the ratio Net 
Result/Total Assets. Gar1 = the value of the lands. Gar 2= the value of the other fixed assets11. Risk= the MFI portfolio risk understood 
through the amount of outstanding loans. FP = the amount of the MFI’s equity capital. Sub = the volume of the grants received by the MFI. 
Dmbres = the volume of the savings collected by the institution. Plcbank = the volume of the funds deposited in banks. Pmbres = the amount 
of loans given by the MFI to its members. CMLT = the amount of the medium-term and long-term loans given by the institution. 
 
 
                                                          
11
 Gar 1 and 2 refer to the guarantee given by the MFI, or the guarantee signal given by the MFI through the value of its 
assets.  
 
Variables Model (1)               Model (2)                            Model (3) 
 Coefficients Standard errors  Coefficients Standard errors  Coefficients Standard errors 
Size 1.51** 0.76 1.51* 0.78 1.56*** 0.49 
Roa -0.94 5.43 -0.94 0.72 -2.31 5.07 
Gar 1 3.64*** 0.23 3.64*** 0.81 3.96*** 0.23 
Gar 2 0.61*** 0.09 0.61 0.46 0.62*** 0.08 
(Risk) -0 .59*** 0.04 -0.596** 0.257 -0.38*** 0.04 
FP 0.31*** 0.04 0.316* 0.187 -0.10*** 0.03 
Sub - 3.04*** 0.44 -3.041** 1.369 -2.43*** 0.38 
Dmbres 0.43*** 0.03 0.433*** 0.154 0.06*** 0.01 
Plcbank 0.73*** 0.09 0.734* 0.394 1.12*** 0.09 
Pmbres -0.57*** 0.04 -0.574*** 0.206 -0.09*** 0.03 
CMLT 0.34*** 0.02 0.339*** 0.112 0.22*** 0.02 
Cons -2.61* 1.35 -2.61** 1.99 -2.57** 0.8 
Observations 776 776 776 
R-sq:  within  =   0. 8835                0.8835  0.8519 
4. Results and discussion 
  The MFI’s size (Size) was a significant determinant for raising funds from the banking sector 
(1% before White correction and 10% after). The positive and significant impact of an MFI’s 
size on its capacity to raise funds was clear, confirming other results in the empirical literature 
(Rajan & Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Beck et al. 2008). Profitability (Roa), in all 
models, was not significant and seems negatively correlated to financing. The negative signal 
obtained for ROA variable is consistent with Titman and Wessels (1988), Rajan and Zingales 
(1995), confirming the theory of the pecking order theory, contrary to the Tradeoff Theory. 
Moreover, we know that MFIs that raise funds from the banks are not necessarily the most 
profitable. Securing funds from banks may require the existence of a guarantee fund. In such a 
case, banks would agree to lend money as long as they are sure they can recover their loan 
should a problem occur. Thus, despite MFIs’ unprofitability, the existence of security funds 
may justify bank refinancing. The guarantee, in particular the Gar1 variable, was highly 
significant (1%) in both models and positively influenced MFI’s capacity to raise funds from 
banks. This result is consistent with those found in Rajan and Zingales (1995). Bankers often 
insist on the benefit of taking into account the value of the intangible assets held by MFIs, as 
these assets offer more guarantees to the creditors. In case of liquidation, they lose less value 
and are less subject to the risk of asymmetric information. Risk (Risk) and Subsidiaries (Sub) 
are highly significant variables in the model and, as expected, negatively affect funds raising 
from banks (1% before and 5% after correcting for heteroscedasticity). Grants have an 
adverse effect on raising fund, since the MFIs that receive more grants are not only the less 
successful, but also the youngest ones. These organizations are still in the first stage of 
development, which may explain banks’ lack of interest to lend to those MFIs. Dmbres 
variable remains constant in terms of significance in all models. This variable is highly 
significant (1%) and positively affects funds raising from banks. The MFIs that manage to 
collect the most deposits are those which are involved in large MFI networks. Although the 
deposits they make are short-term deposits, the loans they ask for are generally medium-term 
and long-term loans. This result was confirmed by the positive influence of medium-term and 
long-term loans (CMLT) on the amount of financing. This demonstrates that the financing 
obtained from banks is mainly used to provide medium-term and long-term loans. Equity 
capitals (FP) have a positive and significant impact on financing (1% before Withe correction 
and 10% after), showing that the level of equity capital facilitates the securing of credit from 
banks. Also the deposits made by MFIs with banks (Plcbank) play a positive role in securing 
credit. These deposits act as a guarantee. In the “migration product” described by Fall (2011), 
when a problem occurs, the bank directly seizes the deposit account of the MFI partner. There 
was a negative correlation between the loans granted to members (Pmbres) and financing. 
This paradox may be explained by the fact that MFIs which receive funds from banks then 
grant them to other customers rather than to their own members. This is a common practice in 
the microfinance sector. Also the MFIs that exclusively finance their members are those more 
oriented towards short-term loans, which explains why they need less long-term funding. 
To test the robustness of our estimations different models were compared to see whether the 
results changed. Overall, there was a high level of consistency of estimations across these 
three models. Except for the significance levels, which changed for a few variables, the three 
models had almost the same results. Finally, the robustness of the results was tested by 
conducting a regression without the profitability (Roa) variable, the only non-significant 




The econometric results observed show that the use of external bank refinancing generally is 
the fact of MFIs in good-standing, those with enough tangible assets, and that are less risky. 
In fact, Senegalese banks deal primarily with large MFI networks that have more resources to 
guarantee their loans and are less exposed to risk, in terms of bank criteria for credit. On the 
contrary, small microfinance organizations have very little access to bank financing. This 
result provides important information, in light of our goal. First, it shows that MFIs, as a 
customer of a bank, must satisfy the traditional criteria to access bank funds. Therefore, there 
are no exceptions within the Bank /MFI financing relationship, despite the fact that MFIs 
often have a social purpose. Second, it shows that MFIs can face a paradox in their financial 
intermediation: on the one hand, they try not to ask for specific material guarantees from their 
customers, and on the other hand, they must comply with bank collateral requirements. This 
result is interesting because the microfinance sector has been in a process of networking and 
concentration since 2008. In fact, increasing an institution’s size is tantamount to giving them 
more resources and more opportunities to have access to bank funding since their requests are 
pooled. Networking should facilitate the access of small organizations to bank resources. 
Businesses that cannot access bank financing on their own as a single entity, can now access 
indirectly through their network. The affiliate network can facilitate the access of MFIs to 
bank resources. In addition, this study has also shown that profitability is not a crucial 
determinant of financing, as it was non-significant in all regressions. However, this result may 
be explained by the fact that banks consider the criterion of profitability as secondary when a 
guarantee funds exist. Fall and Servet (2010) have shown that the Senegalese microfinance 
sector has been relatively well supported by external donors, compared to other areas such as 
Cameroon. Moreover, the data examined in this study shows that the MFIs’ deposits in the 
banks act as financing guarantees, further evidence that the banks which refinance 
microfinance organizations take no risks. Yet it also demonstrates that MFIs can use their 
deposits as a means of influence in negotiations for bank financing. This article is the first to 
empirically investigate financial relationship between banks and microfinance institutions and 
should be extended to other sub-Saharan countries. These results encourage us to do research 
with other countries in order to compare and to highlight the similarities and differences 
between different sub-Saharan countries. For example, the microfinance industry in 
Cameroon is a service industry like banks. Therefore, it is interesting to see whether the 
determinants of financing are similarly or not in these areas 
 
References 
Beck, T.,  Demirgüc¸  -Kunt,  A.,  &  Maksimovic,  V.  (2008) “Financing  patterns  around  the world:  
Are  small  firms  different?”, Journal  of  Financial  Economics,  89(3),  467–487. 
Boot, L. Aivazian, V. Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (2001) “Capital Structure in  
developing countries” Journal of Finance, 56, 87- 130. 
Brière M., and Szafarz, A. (2015) “Does Commercial Microfinance belong the Financial Sector? 
Lessons from the Stock Market” World Development, 60, 110-125. 
Caprio, G., and Honohan, P. (1993) “Excess Liquidity and Monetary Overhangs” World Development,  
21(4), 523-533. 
D’Espallier B., Goedecke, J., Hudon, and M., Mersland, R. (2017) “From NGOs to Banks: Does 
Institutional Transformation Alter the Business Model of Microfinance Institutions?” World 
Development, Vol. 89, pp. 19–33. 
Dorfleitner G., Röhe M., and Renier N. (2016) “The access of microfinance institutions to debt capital: 
An empirical investigation of microfinance investment vehicles”, The Quarterly Review of Economics 
and Finance xxx, xxx–xxx. 
François-Seck Fall, Ousmane Birba (2015) « Adoption des technologies de l’information et de 
la communication en microfinance : expériences sénégalaises », Revue d'économie du 
développement 2015/2 (Vol. 23), p. 71-101. 
 
Fall, François-Seck, (2011) « La complémentarité Banque/Microfinance dans les économies en 
développement: une perspective théorique » Revue d’Economie Industrielle, n.133, 1er trimestre. 
Fall, François-Seck (2010) « La complémentarité Banque/Microfinance dans le contexte subsaharien: 
analyse à travers l’optique de G. B. Richardson » Revue Techniques Financières et Développement, 
TFD, n.101, Décembre. 
Fall, F. S., and Servet, J. M., (2010) « Microfinance peut-elle être sociale et rentable? » Revue Banque, 
n.720, Janvier 
Fall F. S., (2009) « Panorama de la relation Banque/Microfinance à travers le monde », Revue Tiers 
Monde, n.199, Juillet-Septembre 
Ghosh S., and Van Tassel E. (2011) “Microfinance and Competition for external funding” Economics 
Letters, 112, 168-170. 
Hartarska,  V.  and  Nadolnyak,  D.  (2008:) “Does rating  help  microfinance  institutions raise  funds?  
Cross-country  evidence”  International  Review  of  Economics  and Finance,  17(4),  558–571. 
Hartarska, V., and Nadolnyak, D. (2007) “Do regulated microfinance institutions achieve better 
sustainability and outreach? Cross-country evidence”, Applied Economics, 39(10), 1207–1222. 
Hermes, N. and Lensink, R. (2011) “Outreach and efficiency in Microfinance Institutions” World 
Development, 39 (6), 938-348. 
Jayadev, M. and Rao R. N. (2012) “Financial resources of the microfinance sector: Securitisation 
deals-Issues and challenges Interview with the MFIs Grameen Koota and Equitas”, IIMB Management 
Review , 24, 28-39. 
Mersland,  R.  Randøy,  T.  and  Strøm,  R.  Ø.,  (2011) “ The  impact  of  international  influence on  
microbanks’  performance:  A  global  survey”  International  Business  Review, 20(2),  163–176. 
Mersland R. and Strøm R. (2010) “Microfinance Mission Drift?” World Development, 38 (1), 28-36. 
Mersland, R. and Urgeghe, L. (2013) “International debt financing and performance of microfinance 
institutions” Strategic Change, 22, 17-29 
MicroRate (2011) State of microfinance investment 2011: MicroRate, Luminis 
Mignon, V. (2008)  Econométrie: théorie et application : Broché 
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L. (1995) “What do we know about Capital Structure? Some evidence about 
international Data” Journal of Finance, 50 (5), 1421- 1460. 
Reille, X. and Foster, S. (2008) “Foreign Capital Investment in Microfinance: Balancing Social and 
Financial Returns”, Focus Note, Washington, C-GAP. 
Reille, X. Forster, S. and Rozas, D. (2011) “Foreign Capital Investment in Microfinance: Reassessing 
Financial and Social Returns”. Focus Note, Washington, C-GAP. 
Tchuigoua, H. Tch. (2016) “Buffer capital in microfinance institutions”  Journal of Business 
Research, 69, 3523–3537 
Titman, S., & Wessels, R. (1988) “The determinants of capital structure choice” The Journal of 
finance, 43(1), 1-19. 
Younossian, C. S. Fino, D. and Servet J. M. (2007) «De l’aide extérieure à la mobilisation des 
ressources locales » Annuaire suisse de politique de développement, 26 (2), 11-21. 
 
